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1. INTRODUCTION
Climate change and environmental degradation are important challenges faced
by humanity today. Low‐ and middle‐income countries are particularly affected:
alongside extreme weather conditions causing floods and droughts, common
environmental problems include air and water pollution, inefficient use of
resources, unsustainable waste disposal, soil degradation and loss of biodiversity.
Arguably, reversing the current trends of climate change and environmental
degradation will not be possible without a change at the grassroots level: it is
the pro‐environmental awareness, values and, ultimately, behaviour of ordinary
people that will help mitigate future environmental risks. However, when
incomes are relatively low (as they tend to be in poorer countries), basic needs
overtake environmental concerns, limiting people’s ability to think and act in
an environmentally sustainable way and lowering demand for environmental
regulation. What might change people’s environmental behaviours and norms
in such contexts? This paper explores whether change can be brought about by
international migration.
A burgeoning social science literature suggests that emigration can influence
a multitude of political, social and institutional outcomes – government
accountability, political participation, petty corruption, female empowerment,
fertility, and land‐use practices – in migrant communities and countries of origin
(e.g., Montefrio et al., 2014; Roosen and Siegel, 2018; see also Ivlevs and
King (2017) for a summary of this literature). This literature, however, has
overlooked the environmental domain. Little is known about the role of
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migration in shaping pro‐environmentalism1 in migrant‐sending countries and,
more generally, about the determinants of pro‐environmentalism in developing
countries, where migrants tend to originate. This project aims to fill these
knowledge gaps. It contributes to the literature by seeking answers to the
following questions: Do migrants act as agents of diffusion of environmental
awareness, knowledge and practice in their communities of origin? Can the
impact of emigration on pro‐environmentalism back home be negative? Do the
socio‐demographic characteristics (gender, education) of migrants matter?
Answers to these questions are important as they can help design national
and international migration policies that provide environmental benefits (or
minimise environmental costs) to migrant‐sending countries and communities;
more generally, they may encourage policymakers to reconsider the broader
social impact of emigration on the developing world. Also, with the increasing
salience of both environmental and migration issues across the world, it is crucial
to understand the linkages between the two. While the role of climate change and
environmental degradation in driving migration has already received much
attention in academic, public and policy debates (Beine and Parsons, 2015;
Coniglio and Pesce, 2015; Hunter et al., 2015; Maurel and Tuccio, 2016;
Millock, 2015; Rigaud et al., 2018; Xu and Sylwester, 2016), little is known
about the effects of emigration on the environment and pro‐environmentalism
back home. This paper provides the first quantitative evidence on this question
and delves into channels through which emigration may affect pro‐environmental
behaviour in sending countries.
To explore the links between emigration and pro‐environmentalism back home, I
focus on the countries of former Yugoslavia – an economically, politically and
ethnically diverse region in South‐East Europe that is particularly well‐suited for
our analysis. The historical legacy of rapid post‐WWII industrialisation, followed
in the 1990s by the dissolution of the Yugoslav bloc, the transition from planned
to market economy and war destruction, left the region with acute environmental
problems – air pollution, poor wastewater treatment, illegal waste disposal, and
environmental risks from hazardous mining operations and improperly ‘closed’
mining sites (European Environmental Agency, 2010; United Nations Environment
Programme, 2010). Due to the lack of resources, weak governance and low civic
activity, little was done to address these issues. At the same time, former
Yugoslavia has a rich and diverse migration history, the most prominent episode
of which was the intense guestworker emigration to industrialised Western
economies in the 1960s and 70s. I relate the local‐level intensity and composition
(by gender and education) of this major emigration wave to information on
present‐day environmental norms and behaviours, thus identifying the long‐term
1
Here and in what follows, pro‐environmentalism is defined broadly, encompassing pro‐environmental
action, attitudes, beliefs and concerns.
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relationship between international migration and people’s pro‐environmentalism
in migrant‐sending communities.
There are several ways in which this study advances scholarly dialogue.
First, it contributes to the large literature on the links between the environment
and migration. The bulk of this literature has focused on environmental
factors as drivers of international and internal migration (see, e.g., Hunter
et al. (2015) and Millock (2015) for recent reviews). A smaller strand has
focused on the effects of migrant remittances on environmental outcomes
in the migrant‐sending countries. Specifically, scholars have suggested that
emigration and the associated remittances can affect the environment through
the consumption of non‐essential, luxury and status goods that generally
require the high use of energy (Amuedo‐Dorantes, 2014; Davis and
Lopez‐Carr, 2010). In addition, depending on how migrant remittances are used,
migration can lead to either an expansion of agricultural activities and depletion
of local natural resources (Davis and Lopez‐Carr, 2014; Jokisch, 2002; Taylor
et al., 2006) or a lower reliance on land and agriculture, which is accompanied
by the regrowth of native vegetation and preservation of biodiversity (Aide and
Grau, 2004; Hecht and Saatchi, 2007). While the aforementioned studies are
mainly concerned with migrant remittances and the outcomes capturing
environmental quality and environmental risks, little is known about the effects
of emigration (which may or may not be accompanied by monetary remittances)
on environmental attitudes, norms and behaviours in the migrants’ countries/
communities of origin. The present study takes the first step to understand this
overlooked dimension of the migration‐environment nexus.
Second, this study advances the growing literature on the social, institutional
and political effects of emigration. This literature can be traced back to the
seminal work on ‘social remittances’ by sociologist Peggy Levitt (Levitt, 1998);
more recently, the question of how emigration affects people staying behind
has also received much attention among economists and political scientists,
who have looked at outcomes such as democracy, political participation and
voting for particular parties, female empowerment, fertility, and bribing
behaviour (see Ivlevs and King (2017) for a summary of this literature). In
the study most related to ours, Montefrio et al. (2014) use the framework
of social remittances to show how migrants returning from Malaysia to the
Philippines transfer ideas about more efficient palm oil cultivation and land
use, which, the authors note, may result in environmental degradation at home.
I contribute to this body of knowledge with the exploration of the effects of
emigration on environmental attitudes and behaviours – an area that remains
understudied (Carter et al., 2013; Montefrio et al., 2014). Specifically, this
study is the first to show that more intense historical local‐level emigration
reduces pro‐environmental behaviour at the household level, implying that
migrants may be transferring consumerism rather than pro‐environmental
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behaviour. At the same time, keeping the local‐level intensity of the emigration
constant, a higher proportion of women among migrants is associated with more
pro‐environmental action. This finding supports the ‘social remittances’
hypothesis as women are more likely to absorb new norms and transfer them
across borders.
Finally, I highlight the innovative use of the Yugoslav 1971 Population
Census as a source of historical, community‐level data on emigration, which I
match with a large household survey (Life in Transition‐II), conducted in
2010. I argue that both the long‐term and local‐level perspectives are
important and relevant for our analysis: the successful adoption, transfer, and
establishment of environmental norms and practices takes time (hence, the
focus on emigration flows that took place 40 years ago), and environmental
norms and practices can be transferred not only from migrants to their family
members back home but also from migrant to non‐migrant households
within local communities (hence, the focus on the effects of emigration on all
households in a particular locality).
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section two outlines
theoretical mechanisms through which emigration may affect pro‐environmentalism
back home. Section three presents the datasets, variables, and the estimation strategy.
Section four reports and discusses the results, followed by a conclusion.
2. EMIGRATION AND PRO‐ENVIRONMENTALISM BACK HOME:
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED
One can think of at least two ways in which emigration may affect environmental
norms and practices back home: 1) social remittances – the transmission of
environmental norms and practices from migrant host to migrant home
countries, and 2) the monetary‐remittance‐driven growth in consumerism,
which is not compatible with pro‐environmental norms and practices. In what
follows, I discuss the two mechanisms and formulate hypotheses to be tested in the
empirical analysis.
2.1. Theoretical framework
2.1.1. Social remittances In her seminal work, Levitt (1998) defines social
remittances as “ideas, practices, identities, and social capital that flow from
receiving‐ to sending‐country communities” (p. 927). The transmission of social
remittances involves several stages. First, depending on the degree of social
interaction among people in the host country, migrants become exposed to
the norms and practices of the host society, challenge their original views,
and ultimately adopt new ideas and behaviours. Then, through correspondence,
visits and return migration, these new or modified norms and practices are
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transferred from migrant host to home communities. While one would expect
most exchanges to happen at the family level – arguably, family is the most
important bridge linking migrants to their home countries – Levitt emphasises
that the range of social remittance recipients goes well beyond the migrant
household. Specifically, the diffusion of ideas, norms and practices can occur
through local institutions, such as community centres and churches, as well as
from migrant to non‐migrant households. In fact, a community (rather than
household) perspective is central to Levitt’s analysis, as social remittances are
defined as transfers of norms, ideas and practices between the migrant‐receiving
and migrant‐sending communities.
I argue that the social remittances framework can be applied to the
environmental domain. Following Levitt’s approach, several conditions need to
be satisfied for the migration‐driven transfer of environmental norms and
practices to happen. First, they must be different in the host and home countries.
This is likely to be the case for the most common type of migration – from poorer
to wealthier countries. Specifically, an influential thesis developed by Ronald
Inglehart (see e.g. Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Kidd and
Lee, 1997) posits that people in high‐income countries have higher levels of
physical and economic security and are therefore more likely to hold
post‐materialistic values. Among other things, these values include concern
about global environmental risks such as climate change, a recognition that
high levels of consumption are detrimental to the environment, and attempts
to limit consumption‐driven environmental degradation through household
waste recycling, buying local products, saving water and energy, and choosing
environmentally‐friendly transport. By contrast, in poorer countries people are
more likely to be concerned about the levels and quality of consumption rather
than its effects on the environment; hence their generally lower awareness of
and concern for environmental problems (especially at the global level) and
lower levels of individual and collective pro‐environmental action.2
Second, migrants have to be exposed to the host country’s environmental
norms and practices, challenge their original views and adopt the new practices
and ways of thinking about the environment. There is some evidence to support
this conjecture. For example, Carter et al. (2013) provide a detailed account of
how Mexican immigrants in the US negotiate, internalise and adopt local
environmental norms and behaviours. They also find that immigrants conform
2
For example, in 2008 people in the EU member states with relatively low GDP per capita (Central and
Eastern European countries that joined the bloc in 2004 and 2007) tended to be less worried about climate
change, the depletion of natural resources, loss of biodiversity, and their own consumption habits, and were
less likely to undertake pro‐environmental action than their counterparts in high GDP per capita Western
European countries (European Commission, 2008). It should also be noted here that higher levels of
consumption of people in wealthier countries could be viewed as inconsistent with their more pronounced
pro‐environmental norms and behaviours.
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to the new environmental and social norms in an attempt to acculturate and
become accepted in the host community.3
Third, there must be enough opportunities for information, norms and behaviours
to be exchanged between the home and host communities – these include migrants
visiting relatives back home, circular and return migration, friends and relatives
visiting migrants in the host countries, calls, correspondence etc. This condition is
likely to be satisfied, as for some time migration has been viewed as a transnational
phenomenon (Levitt, 2005). Falling communication and travel costs make it easier
to develop and maintain transnational spaces and communities (Vertovec, 2004)
and participate in social, economic and political life both at home and abroad.
It could also be argued that particular groups of migrants may be more
receptive to the environmental views and practices encountered in their host
countries and more willing to transfer or absorb them back home. It is, for
example, well documented that women and the educated are more likely to hold
pro‐environmental attitudes and beliefs, be concerned about the environment,
and act in an environmentally‐friendly way (Gifford and Nilsson, 2014; Hunter
et al., 2004; Meyer, 2015). In addition, migrant women may be more likely to
absorb and transmit social remittances back home, and the stay‐behind women
are generally more receptive to new norms and ideas transmitted by migrants
(Levitt, 2005; Vianello, 2013; Vlase, 2013). We may therefore expect that the
gender and educational composition of the local emigration flows matters for
the subsequent diffusion of pro‐environmental norms and practices.
Finally, it should be noted that the migration‐induced transmission of norms and
practices may be unintentional or intentional. One the one hand, migrants may not
intentionally seek to be exposed to, absorb or exchange the new norms with the home
country; yet, their transmission would take place nonetheless. On the other hand,
migrants may wish – intentionally – to transfer particular practices to those staying
behind, because migrants are convinced that these practices (for example, waste
separation) are good and should be adopted in the home communities. In extreme
cases, to ensure that new norms and practices are indeed adopted, migrant may, for
example, threaten to stop sending monetary remittances (Ivlevs and King, 2017).
2.1.2. Migration‐driven consumerism It has often been argued, and shown
empirically, that money sent home by migrants is disproportionately spent on status,
luxury, non‐essential and non‐productive goods and services (Amuedo‐Dorantes,
3
Note that, before internalising and adopting the environmental norms and practices of host countries,
immigrants are likely to act upon the environmental norms of their home countries. For example, Kountouris
and Remoundou (2016) show that immigrants from countries with greater pro‐environmental beliefs are
more willing to trade off income for environmental quality. It is an open question whether in such rather
unusual situations (migrant host countries being less ‘pro‐environmental’ than home countries) immigrants
will internalise and adopt ‘inferior’ environmental norms and practices of host countries.
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2014; Davis and Lopez‐Carr, 2010; El‐Sakka and McNabb, 1999; Stephenson and
Wilsker, 2016; Strielkowski and Weyskrabova, 2014). This may happen for several
reasons. First, according to the analytical framework of the New Economics of
Labour Migration, one of the forces driving emigration is relative deprivation – a
perception that one’s personal or household status within a particular reference
group (group of friends, a neighbourhood, village, town etc.) is relatively low (Stark
and Taylor, 1991). In this context, emigration is an attempt to reduce the feeling of
relative deprivation, for example by sending monetary remittances to household
members back home or engaging in circular or return migration; in both cases
money earned abroad can be spent on status goods at home and therefore increase
the relative position of the migrant and his/her household.
Second, during their stay abroad emigrants get exposed to greater levels of
consumerism relative to their home countries (Carter et al., 2013; Davis and
Lopez‐Carr, 2010). Migrants may therefore acquire a taste for consumerism and,
following Levitt’s social remittances hypothesis, transfer to their communities of
origin the willingness to consume more, bigger, newer, and often imported
products. Such transfers occur whenmigrants engage in circular migration or return
home, control the use of monetary remittances, or when migrants’ family members
make visits abroad. Less direct ways of transferring a taste for consumerism may
include watching foreign television channels and getting exposed to foreign
consumption patterns – an activity enabled by the purchase of a TV and satellite
dish with money sent from abroad.
Notwithstanding the exact mechanism for growing consumerism among migrant
households, it usually comes at a cost of higher energy consumption and a greater
burden for the environment (Amuedo‐Dorantes, 2014; Ivanova et al., 2016; Walker
and Bellingham, 2011). One might also expect that, at least in the early stages of the
expansion of consumerism, people have little realisation that their purchases are
detrimental for the global environment. If anything, growing incomes and wealth
may lead to less pro‐environmental action – for example, in order to signal status,
people will use their own car rather than public transportation or consume
imported rather than local products; they will also have a less need to save water
and electricity. Following this line of reasoning, we might expect that people
in communities characterised by more intense out‐migration undertake less
pro‐environmental action than their counterparts in communities with less intense
emigration, although the greater pro‐environmental action of the latter would be
driven by necessity rather than choice (e.g., people are more likely to save water
and electricity when they are poor).4
As for other, more subjective, environmental outcomes, such as concern,
informedness and beliefs about climate change, it is a priori unclear how
4
See, e.g., Ivlevs (2019) showing that households hit by the economic crisis are more likely to undertake
pro‐environmental action.
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migration‐driven consumerism may affect them. While a substantial rise in living
standards for most people would lead to the development of post‐materialistic
values, including awareness of and concern for global environmental problems, it
is questionable whether in a typical migrant‐sending country monetary remittances
would result in a rise in living standards that is ubiquitous and high enough to
trigger such a value change.
2.2. Hypotheses
The previous section has outlined the norm transfer (‘social remittances’) and
consumerism channels – specific theoretical frameworks in which emigration
could affect in environmental norms and practices back home. Whether such
changes takes place in reality is an empirical question. Based on the discussion
above, I formulate the following hypotheses:
H1 : More intense local emigration leads to greater pro‐environmentalism
among people staying behind.
H2a : A greater proportion of women among emigrants leads to greater gains
in pro‐environmentalism among people staying behind.
H2b : A greater proportion of educated people among emigrants leads to
greater gains in pro‐environmentalism among people staying behind.
In addition, I will test if local‐level emigration in more important in shaping
pro‐environmental behaviour of women, the better educated and the better‐off
among those staying behind.
H3a : Local‐level emigration has a greater influence on the pro‐environmental
behaviour of women staying behind
H3b : Local‐level emigration has a greater influence on the pro‐environmental
behaviour of more educated people among those staying behind
H3b : Local‐level emigration has a greater influence on the pro‐environmental
behaviour of wealthier people among those staying behind
3. DATA, VARIABLES, AND ESTIMATION STRATEGY
3.1. Data
Data for the empirical analysis come from the ‘Life in Transition‐II’ survey,
that I match with the emigration statistics from the 1971 Yugoslav Population
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Census. The “Life in Transition‐II” survey was conducted by the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank in autumn 2010.5
Twenty eight post‐socialist economies of Central and Eastern Europe and Central
Asia, Turkey, Mongolia, as well as five Western European countries (France,
Germany, Italy, Sweden and the UK), participated in the survey. The nationally
representative samples consisted of 1,000 respondents per country (1,500
respondents in the case of larger countries: Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan,
Serbia, Poland and the UK). In each country, households were selected according
to a two‐stage clustered stratified sampling procedure. In the first stage, the
frame of primary sampling units was established using information on
geo‐administrative or electoral units. In the second stage, a random walk
fieldwork procedure was used to select households within primary sampling
units. Respondents within households were selected randomly using a selection
grid. A detailed account of the survey design and implementation methodology,
as well as information on how to access the data, can be found on the survey
website (http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/1533).
While the “Life in Transition‐II” survey contains extensive information on the
respondents’ environmental beliefs, attitudes and behaviours (Section 5 of the
survey), it included no questions that would allow for the capturing of emigration
(either short or long‐term) of household members. However, it is known in
which municipalities, within each country, respondents reside. This allows
merging the LITS‐II dataset with external, municipality‐level data on emigration.
One such external data source is the 1971 Yugoslav Population Census, which
provides historical, municipality‐level emigration information for what are now
seven successor states of former Yugoslavia: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia,
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Kosovo, Montenegro,
Serbia, and Slovenia. The information provided by this census includes the
number of emigrants at the municipality level (altogether 502 municipalities, of
which 232 are represented in the Life in Transition‐II survey), as well as various
migrant characteristics, such as gender and education (Baucic, 1979). This
information was supplied by migrants’ family members and, when the whole
household had emigrated, by neighbours. Emigrants were defined as “Yugoslav
workers temporarily employed abroad”. This means that the data only capture
guest worker migration flows, which started in the mid‐1960s and were close to
their peak in 1971,6 and underestimate the total stock of Yugoslav emigrants at
that time.
5
Two other waves of the survey were conducted in 2006 (Life in Transition‐I) and 2015/16 (Life in
Transition‐III). I use the second wave (Life in Transition‐II) as only it contains detailed questions on
environmental behaviours and attitudes. Note that Life in Transition is not a longitudinal survey: different
respondents were interviewed in different waves.
6
The guestworker migration stopped abruptly after the 1973 oil shock, but was continued by family
reunification flows afterwards.
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Given that all seven successor states of former Yugoslavia were represented in
the Life in Transition‐II survey, our working sample consists of over 7,700
observations/interviews.
3.2. Variables
3.2.1. Outcome variable(s) Section 5 of LITS‐II survey contains a range of
questions that we use to capture people’s pro‐environmental behaviours,
environmental concerns, environmental beliefs, and informedness about climate
change.7 First, respondents were asked, “Have you personally taken actions aimed
at helping to fight climate change?” If the answer was affirmative, the respondents
were asked to specify, from a list of ten options, which actions they had taken
(multiple answers were possible). Reduced energy consumption and reduced
water consumption were the most common actions (indicated by 19 and 17% of
respondents, respectively), followed by waste recycling (16%), reduced
consumption of disposable items (14%), and choosing environmentally‐friendly
means of transportation (13%). Less common actions included buying
seasonal and local produce (8%), reduced car use (7%), purchasing a more
environmentally‐friendly car (6%), avoiding taking short‐haul flights (3%), and
installing equipment that generates renewable energy (1%). Overall, 31% of
respondents indicated they had undertaken at least one pro‐environmental action.
I created separate dummy variables to capture each of the ten actions. In addition,
I constructed an index of pro‐environmental behaviour by summing up the ten
action variables. The index ranges from 0 to 10, with greater values indicating a
greater range of pro‐environmental actions undertaken.8
Second, the respondents were asked, “How concerned are you about climate
change? Please answer on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means that you are not at
all concerned and 5 means you are extremely concerned.” Using this information,
I created a variable concerned about climate change with values of 1 to 5.
Third, respondents were asked to evaluate, on a scale of 1 to 4, howwell they were
informed about: 1) the causes of climate change; 2) the consequences of climate
change; 3) ways in which one can slow down climate change; and 4) ways in which
one can adapt to climate change, where 1 indicates “not at all informed” and 4 “very
well informed”. I summed respondents’ answers to these four questions to create an
index of informedness/knowledge about climate change, which ranges from 4 to 16.
7
Section 3 of the survey (Attitudes and values) also includes a question on willingness to pay for climate
change mitigation. I have not included this variable into analysis and leave the exploration of its relationship
with emigration for future research.
8
As a robustness check, I also constructed a pro‐environmental action index with principal components. This
index, capturing the common variation among the ten pro‐environmental dummies (we retained the first
principal component with the eigenvalue of 4.03), produces the same results as the index constructed by
summing up the action dummies (the correlation between the two indexes is 0.999).
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Finally, respondents were asked to what extent they agreed with the following
statements: “The seriousness of climate change has been exaggerated” and
“Emission of CO2 has a major impact on climate change”, with five possible
answers ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Reversing the
answer value scale for the first statement and then adding together respondents’
answers to the two statements, I obtained an index of pro‐environmental beliefs,
which ranges from 2 to 10. Higher values of this variable indicate lower levels of
scepticism about the seriousness of climate change and a stronger conviction that
greenhouse gas emissions have a major impact on climate change.9
3.2.2. Main regressor(s) The main regressors are the characteristics of
local‐level, historical migration flows, sourced from the 1971 Yugoslav Census
(Baucic, 1973). First, to capture the local‐level emigration intensity, I constructed
a variable “emigration rate”, by dividing the number of emigrants in a municipality
by its population (see Figure 1 in the Supplementary Information document for
spatial distribution). Second, information is available on how many emigrants
in each municipality 1) were women and 2) had at least a secondary (general or
technical) education. This information was used to construct variables capturing
the corresponding characteristics of emigration at the municipality level (all as %
of total migrants).
3.2.3. Control variables All regressions include the following control variables
(see supplementary information for summary statistics): gender, age group
(18‐24, 25‐34, 35‐44, 45‐54, 55‐64, and 65+), marital status (single, married,
divorced/separated, widowed), education level (primary, secondary, tertiary),
household wealth index (constructed by extracting the first principle component
from information on whether there is a car, secondary residence, bank account,
debit card, credit card, mobile phone, computer, and internet access in the household),
and type of residence (rural, urban).
In addition, I want to control for a potential confounder – the historical level of
local economic development that might have influenced both the local emigration
rates and local levels of pro‐environmentalism (the latter might have persisted to
the present day). As there are no publicly available data directly capturing local
economic development for 1971, I proxy it with the share of illiterate people at the
municipality level (these data are available in the Yugoslav Population Census
1971). In addition, I make use of the variable average municipality income (“narodni
dohodak”), available for 1981 from the Geographical Atlas of Yugoslavia (Bertic,
1987); the variable is defined as an index relative to the Yugoslav average (100).
9
Note that all variables that I use to capture pro‐environmentalism, including action taken to combat
climate change, are not immune to desirability bias.
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Finally, the inclusion of country‐fixed effects (a dichotomous variable for
each of the seven countries present in the analysis) will account for all
country‐wide influences on the intensity/characteristics of historical migration
and/or present‐day environmental attitudes/behaviours.
3.3. Estimation strategy
The main model to be estimated can be expressed as follows:
Pro  environmentalijk ¼ β0 þ β1 emigration rateð Þ1971; jk
þ β2 individual controlsð Þijk
þ β3 municipality illiteracy rateð Þ1971; jk
þ β4 average municipality incomeð Þ1981; jk
þ β5 country  fixed effectsð Þk
þ idiosyncratic error termijk
(1)
where, for individual i living in municipality j and country k, pro‐environmental
stands for variables capturing environmental behaviours, concerns, beliefs or
informedness, and individual controls are as described above.
To ascertain the role of the composition of historical emigration flows for
present‐day pro‐environmentalism, I add to Model 1 the municipality‐level
variables capturing the gender and education composition of the emigration
flows. Note the variable emigration rate, which captures the intensity of
emigration flows, remains in the model. Formally:
Pro  environmentalijk ¼ β0 þ β1 emigration rateð Þ1971; jk
þ β2 composition of emigrationð Þ1971; jk
þ β3 individual controlsð Þijk
þ β4 municipality illiteracy rateð Þ1971; jk
þ β5 average municipality incomeð Þ1981; jk
þ β6 country  fixed effectsð Þk
þ idiosyncratic error termijk
(no:)
The models are estimated with OLS (probit for binary outcomes variables), using
heteroscedascicity‐robust standard errors and accounting for clustering at the
municipality level. In all models, I use the population weights provided by the survey.
Note that the estimated coefficients in Models 1 and 2 should be interpreted as
(conditional) correlations rather than causal effects. In an attempt to move closer
to causality, in section 5.2 I discuss and implement an instrumental variable
strategy that helps address potential endogeneity of the main regressor.
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4. RESULTS
4.1. Main results
Table 1 reports the results of models estimating the relationship between the
local‐level long‐term emigration intensity and various environmental outcomes.
Controlling for other factors (respondents’ socio‐demographic characteristics,
historical levels of economic development and country‐fixed effects), I find that
a greater intensity of local‐level emigration in 1971 is associated with less
pro‐environmental action undertaken in 2010 (Column 1); the coefficient is
highly significant (p = 0.007). In terms of magnitude, an increase in the local
emigration rate by one percentage point is associated with a decrease of 0.051
pro‐environmental actions being undertaken by local residents; an increase in
the local emigration rate from 0.5% to 18.6% – the lowest and the highest levels
observed in our sample – would thus correspond to a reduction of close to one
(0.92) pro‐environmental action undertaken by local residents, which is a large
effect relative to the average number of pro‐environmental actions undertaken
by an individual (1.05).
At the same time, the results show that the intensity of local emigration is 1971 is
not correlated with the three other environmental outcomes: concern about climate
change, being informed about climate change, and pro‐environmental beliefs
(Columns 2‐4 of Table 1). As these outcomes are generally considered important
determinants of pro‐environmental action (Ivlevs, 2019), these findings imply,
among other things, that the negative association between the local emigration rate
and pro‐environmental action (Column 1) is not driven by a possible effect of
emigration on environmental concern, informedness or beliefs. For a formal test,
I have added environmental concern, informedness and beliefs to the model
explaining pro‐environmental action. The results, reported in Column 5 of Table 1,
do indeed suggest that they are strong predictors of pro‐environmental action;
however, accounting for these factors, the coefficient of the local emigration rate
is close to one reported in Column 1.
Concerning control variables, the results point to the important role of gender
and education for pro‐environmentalism: women are more likely to undertake
pro‐environmental action and be more concerned about climate change, and
higher levels of education are associated with greater levels of all environmental
variables; these findings are consistent with earlier studies (Gifford and
Nilsson, 2014; Meyer, 2015). The wealth index is also a positive and statistically
significant predictor of all environmental outcomes. This result is consistent with
the affluence/prosperity hypothesis (Diekmann and Franzen, 1999), that posits
that environmental quality not only as a public but also a normal private good
meaning that people with higher income can ‘afford’ pro‐environmental attitudes
and behaviour, and the associated empirical evidence from both wealthier and
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poorer nations that greater household income/wealth is associated with greater
pro‐environmentalism (see e.g. Ivlevs (2019) for an overview).10 Among other
controls, younger people are somewhat less likely to undertake pro‐environmental
action, the single tend to be less concerned about climate change, the widowed
undertake less pro‐environmental action and are less informed about climate change,
and rural dwellers are both less concerned and less informed about climate change.
Concerning the two contextual controls, the average municipality income of 1981
and the municipality illiteracy rate of 1971 are negatively associated with concern
for and informedness about climate change, respectively.11
I also checked if the obtained coefficients of the local migration rate variable
might be due to omitted variable bias (especially in Columns 1 and 5, where
they are statistically significant). Implementing the Oster test of selection on
unobservables (Oster, 2019), I found delta values12 of ‐2.19 and ‐2.82 for the
emigration rate in Specifications 1 and 5 of Table 1, respectively. Negative
delta values indicate that adding controls to the model strengthens the magnitude
of the effect of the local migration rate, also meaning that is it unlikely that the
unobservables are driving the results (Graham et al., 2017).
Overall, given that most Yugoslav migrants went to wealthy industrialised
economies (Germany, Switzerland, France, Sweden etc.), where environmental
awareness and pro‐environmental activism is among the highest in the world,
the results presented in Table 1 would contradict the conjecture that migrants in
Yugoslavia transfer environmental norms and behaviours from host to home
10
It is important to consider potential links between household wealth and historical local‐level emigration
levels, as the latter may increase the former through receipt of monetary remittances. The correlation
between the two variables is positive but relatively low (0.028, significant at the 95% level). Estimating
models 1‐5 of Table 1 without the local‐level emigration rate still yields a coefficient of the wealth index
that is positive and statistically significant; when the wealth index is excluded, the local‐level emigration
rate also remains negative and statistically significant in models 1 and 5 and statistically insignificant in
models 2‐4. In all cases, the absolute values of the estimates of the wealth index and the local‐level
emigration rate are somewhat lower, reflecting (the relatively low) correlation between the two. It also
should be remembered that households with similar wealth levels (as defined in this study) may have
different environmental impacts. For example, households in high‐migration areas may have bigger
houses and less economical cars and thus a greater carbon footprint than households in low‐migration
areas with smaller houses and economical cars, even if the wealth indexes of the two, based on whether
the household possesses (any) house and car, would be the same.
11
I have experimented with excluding the two contextual controls from the models and did not obtain any
change in the coefficients of the 1971 emigration rate.
12
This measure indicates how large selection on unobservable variables should be, relative to selection on
observables, to nullify the estimated effect of a regressor. Formally, δ¼ β
C RC  RU 
βU  βC  Rmax  RC , where
βC and RC are the variable’s estimate and the R2 from a regression with a full set of (observable)
controls, βU and RU the variable’s estimate and the R2 from a regression where (observable) controls are




from a hypothetical regression that controls for all observed and unobserved
covariates (Oster (2019) recommends a value of 1.3*R
C
, which I have also used in this paper).
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countries. However, the results support the conjecture that emigration has a
negative effect on pro‐environmental action in the communities of origin because
migrant remittances are often invested in status and luxury goods that require a
high energy consumption. To explore this point further, I look at the links between
the local‐level emigration rate of 1971 and specific pro‐environmental actions.
The results are reported in Table 2 (for brevity, I only show the coefficients of
interest; the same control variables as in specifications 1‐4 of Table 1 are
included in all regressions,13 and complete econometric output is available in
the supplementary information document). The coefficient of the emigration rate
is negative in all specifications and statistically significant for five out of ten
environmental actions: other things equal, more intense local emigration in 1971
is associated with a lower likelihood of reducing the use of one’s own car, reducing
energy and water consumption, reducing disposable items, as well as buying
local/seasonal produce in 2010.14 Most of these outcomes – the use of one’s own
car, high energy and water consumption, and the use of disposable items – are
concomitant with increased material comfort and the possession of status/luxury
goods such as big cars and houses. This further supports the idea that emigration
reduces pro‐environmental action through the use of monetary remittances.
Next, I explore the links between the environmental outcomes and the
characteristics of local historical emigration. To this end, I add two variables
to the main model: the share of women among migrants and the share of the
educated among migrants. Note that the municipality emigration rate in 1971
is also included in all regressions. The results, reported in Table 3, suggest that,
controlling for the overall intensity of local emigration, a greater proportion of
women among migrants is associated with a greater probability of undertaking
pro‐environmental action (Specifications 1 and 5); the coefficient is significant
at the 99% level.15 In terms of magnitude, an increase of one percentage point
in the share of women among migrants is associated with 0.019 more
pro‐environmental actions; in other words, in municipalities with the highest share
of women among 1971 migrants (54.8%), people undertake approximately one
more pro‐environmental action than in municipalities with the lowest share of
women among migrants (0.6%). Note that the overall intensity of emigration in
1971 remains negative and statistically significant. This implies that people living
in municipalities with more intense emigration in 1971 are on average less likely
13
The results presented in Table 2 are also robust for the inclusion of the three environmental controls
(concern, informedness and beliefs about climate change).
14
The Oster test deltas for the local migration rate variable, calculated on the corresponding OLS regressions,
range between ‐2.05 and ‐3.29, meaning that the estimates are unlikely to be driven by omitted variables.
15
The Oster test deltas for the proportion of women variable are equal to 2.07 and 2.17 in specifications 1
and 5, respectively. This implies that the omitted variables would have to be at least twice as important
determinants of pro‐environmental action than the included controls to nullify the estimates of the share
of women variable. In other words, the results are unlikely to suffer from the omitted variable bias.
EMIGRATION AND PRO‐ENVIRONMENTAL BEHAVIOUR







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































EMIGRATION AND PRO‐ENVIRONMENTAL BEHAVIOUR
© 2020 The Authors. Kyklos published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd 65
to undertake pro‐environmental action; however, a greater share of women among
these migrants mitigates this negative effect and potentially overturns it.
Specifically, if we substitute the actual values of the local emigration intensity
and the share of women among migrants into the estimated equation 5 of Table 3,
the joint effect of the two variables on pro‐environmental action is negative for
only 15% of municipalities (comprising 16% of the respondent sample) and
positive for the remaining 85% (comprising 84% of the respondent sample). It is
worth mentioning here that the correlation between the overall emigration rate
and the share of women among migrants is positive but relatively low (0.17).
At the same time, the gender composition of the 1971 emigration flows is not a
statistically significant predictor of environmental concern, informedness or
beliefs (columns 2‐4 of Table 3). Also, the share of the educated among migrants
is statistically significant in all specifications, with the exception of the
environmental concern model, where it is negative and significant at the 10%
level. To check whether these results could be due to multicollinearity, I have
estimated three sets of models including only one compositional dimension at a
time (and always keeping the overall emigration rate in the models). I obtained
the same picture: when included separately, only the gender variable was significant
(and positive) in the pro‐environmental action specification; the educational
variable was negative and marginally significant in the concern specification.
Given that it is the emigration of women that appears to contribute to
pro‐environmental action back home, I checked how it is related to specific
pro‐environmental activities (Table 4). Estimating Model 2 with the variable
capturing the proportion of women among the 1971 migrants, I found that more
women among migrants is associated with a greater likelihood of recycling waste
and reducing the use of disposable items (in both cases, the variable is significant
at the 1% level; Columns 1 and 8 of Table 4), using environmentally‐friendly
transport (significant at 5%; Column 4 of Table 4) and buying local and seasonal
produce (significant at 10%; Column 9 of Table 4).16 Most of these outcomes
represent a genuine effort to care for the environment, suggesting that female
migration results in the transfer of pro‐environmental behaviours. This is consistent
with Levitt (2005) arguing that migrant women are more likely to absorb new norms
and behaviours of their host countries and transfer them back home.
Finally, to check whether local‐level emigration is more important in shaping
pro‐environmentalism of stay‐behind women, those with higher education and
higher wealth, I interact the emigration rate with the respondents’ gender, education
and wealth. The results suggest that the interaction terms between gender (female)
and the emigration rate is positive and significant at the 99% level in the
pro‐environmental beliefs specification (Column 4 of Table 5). This means that
16
The Oster test deltas, calculated on the corresponding OLS regressions, range from 1.86 to 8.28,
meaning the results are unlikely to suffer from the omitted variable bias.
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women staying behind are more likely to hold pro‐environmental beliefs if the
local‐level historical emigration intensity is high, which lends additional
support for the Levitt’s social remittances hypothesis, as women are more receptive
to new norms and practices (Levitt, 2005). The interaction term between the
local‐level emigration intensity and primary education is also statistically
significant (at the 90% level) and negative in the environmental concern
specification (Column 2 of Table 5), implying that people with lower levels of
education are less concerned about climate change in high‐migration areas. While
it is still the case that people with primary education are on average less concerned
about climate change, which conforms to the literature (e.g. Meyer, 2015), our
results suggest that the lack of environmental concern is amplified with the
intensity of the local‐level emigration.
4.2. Instrumental variable results
The Yugoslav emigration of the 1960s and 70s was the outcome of bilateral
guestworker agreements between Yugoslavia and Western countries, with foreign
companies involved in the direct recruitment of workers on the Yugoslav
territory (Ivlevs and King, 2017; Novinscak, 2009). While this type of migration
can, at least to some extent, be viewed as ‘managed’ and thus would mitigate
certain selection biases, the decision of the Yugoslav workers to go abroad
was by no means forced or random. It is therefore still possible that some
local‐level characteristics influenced both the intensity of emigration in 1971
and pro‐environmentalism in 2010 (an example of such a confounder could
be historical economic development at the local level, and this has already
been included as a control in the analysis). If local‐level confounders exist
and remain unaccounted for, the correlational results will be biased relative to
the underlying causal effects.
To deal with potential endogeneity and move closer to causal effects, I employ
the instrumental variable approach. In a nutshell, the method relies on finding an
instrument – a variable highly correlated with the endogenous regressor (in our
case, the intensity of 1971 emigration at the local level) and having no direct
effect on the outcome (pro‐environmentalism in 2010). The estimation consists
of two stages: first, the endogenous regressor is regressed on the instrument(s)
and the complete set of control variables; second, the outcome is regressed on
the predicted values of the first‐stage‐regression alongside the full set of controls.
The proposed instrument for the local‐level emigration intensity in 1971 is the
local‐level emigration intensity for 1901‐1910. It is documented that, in the
countries of ex‐Yugoslavia, there are strong links between successive waves of
emigration at the local level: in particular, the intensity of the local‐level
emigration at the turn of the 20th century and the interwar period can explain
the local‐level intensity of guestworker emigration of the 1960s and 70s
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(Brunnbauer, 2009, p. 34).17 More broadly, there is a strong consensus that
diasporas facilitate further migration through the reduction of migration costs
(Beine et al., 2011; Collier and Hoeffler, 2018; Massey et al., 1998) and the links
between successive migration waves are particularly strong at the local level
(Comola and Mendola, 2015). Local‐ and regional‐level emigrant intensity has
indeed been widely used as an instrument for subsequent emigration waves in
studies addressing the effects of emigration on sending country outcomes (see
e.g. Anelli and Peri, 2017; Hildebrandt and McKenzie, 2005; Ivlevs and
King, 2017; McKenzie and Sasin, 2007).
I expect that the local‐level emigration rates of the early 20th century will be a
sufficiently strong predictor of the local‐level guestworker emigration rates of
1971. There is also no reason to expect that the emigration that took place in
1901‐1910 would directly affect people’s pro‐environmental norms and
behaviours more than a century later (in 2010); i.e., the instrument is likely to
be exogenous to the outcomes I study.
The data for the 1901‐1910 local‐level emigration rates come from Table XLI of
the Statistical Atlas of the Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia 1875‐1915 (Statistički
atlas kraljevina Hrvatske i Slavonije 1875.‐ 1915., published in 1915). The Atlas
covers only the territory of the Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia Kingdom, which,
at the turn of the century, was an autonomous territory of the Austro‐Hungarian
Empire and corresponded to the present‐day Croatia (excluding the Istrian
peninsula west of Rijeka and the Dalmatian coast south of Zadar) and a handful
of municipalities in Serbia’s region of Vojvodina (see Figure 2 in the Supplementary
Information document). Therefore, to be able to use the instrument, I will need to
limit our original sample of seven Yugoslav countries to the households that were
interviewed on the territory of the former Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia. This
amounts to a sub‐sample of 691 respondents, distributed across 20 municipalities
in Croatia (there are altogether 28 Croatian municipalities included in the LITS‐2
dataset) and three municipalities in Serbia.
The emigration rate in the Atlas is defined as the percentage of people who
moved abroad from a particular municipality (kotar)18 during the period
1901‐1910 relative to the average yearly population level in this municipality
in 1890‐1910. For the municipalities included in our sample, it ranges from 1
to 13%, with an average of 5%. I match these data with the LITS‐2 survey
through the municipality identifier.
The 1st stage instrumental variable results suggest that, controlling for the same
variables as in Table 1, an increase of one percentage point in the emigration rate
of 1901‐10 is associated with a 0.082 percentage point increase in the emigration
17
In turn, guestworker migration can explain the local‐level intensity of the subsequent family reunification
migration of the 1980s and the refugee migration of the 1990s and 2000s (Novinscak, 2009).
18
There were 70 kotars in the Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia. The 1901‐1910 administrative division
by kotars closely corresponds to the municipal division of 1971 on the same territory.
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rate of 1971 (β = 0.082; p< 0.001). The 1901‐10 emigration rate is thus a positive
(as expected) and statistically significant predictor of the emigration rate of 1971.
Its relevance is confirmed by the F (Kleibergen‐Paap) test of excluded instruments,
the values of which in all specifications exceed the commonly accepted threshold
of 10 (Table 6).
The 2nd stage instrumental variable results, reported in Table 6, show that the
higher intensity of local emigration in 1971 (as predicted by the local emigration
rates of 1901‐10), led to less pro‐environmental action and lower concern for
the environment in 2010.19 The instrumental variable results thus reinforce the
correlational results presented in Table 1, confirming that long‐term emigration
reduces pro‐environmental outcomes as well as environmental concern.
4.3. Limitations and directions for future research
While this study provides the first evidence of the effects of emigration on
pro‐environmentalism in the migrant communities of origin, it is not without
limitations. First, given data constraints, the only feasible way to test the hypotheses
was to combine local‐level explanatory variables (historical emigration rates) with
individual/household‐level outcomes (pro‐environmental actions, attitudes and
beliefs). Depending on the availability of appropriate data, future research could
verify whether the evidence obtained in this study also holds if the analysis is
conducted purely at the household level, at the regional level, and at the country
level. Second, while I have argued that there has to be sufficient time for emigration
to be able to affect pro‐environmental norms and behaviours in the communities of
origin, and hence looked at the effects of a historical (four decades old) emigration
wave, one could argue that more recent emigration dynamics at the local level
also have an additional effect on the pro‐environmentalism of those staying
behind. Subject to data availability, future research could look at how more recent
local‐, as well as household‐level, emigration relates to the pro‐environmental
norms and behaviours of those staying behind; in the context of post‐Yugoslav
countries, particular attention could also be paid to refugee outflows and returns.
Third, I have tried to establish causality using the instrumental variable technique,
using more than a century old local migration intensity as a source of variation
for local emigration rates that is exogenous to present‐day pro‐environmentalism.
Another way to deal with the endogeneity due to omitted variables would be to
use longitudinal data which would allow relating the changes in environmental
outcomes of the same units of analysis (households, communities, countries) to
changes in emigration. Again, data constraints have not allowedme to carry out this
19
It should be noted that both the magnitude of the coefficients and the standard errors of the instrumented
regressor are relatively large. The latter could be an indication of a weak instrument, and the results
should be treated with caution.
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type of analysis, and I leave it for future research. Finally, the evidence offered by
this study to support the consumerism and social remittances channels is indirect.
Future research should could delve into exact reasons for how emigration affects
pro‐environmental behaviour and norms back home, for example by conducting
qualitative in‐depth interviews or designing surveys that would allow uncover the
effects directly.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper set out to determine whether emigration has an impact on the
environmental norms and behaviours of people staying in the migrant communities
of origin. Focusing on former Yugoslavia, I found that the present‐day likelihood of
undertaking pro‐environmental action is negatively associated with the local‐level
intensity of a major emigration wave that took place four decades earlier;
instrumental variable results support the causal nature of this relationship. A
possible explanation for this finding is the conjecture that migrant remittances
are disproportionately spent on status and luxury goods, the possession of
which is rarely compatible with pro‐environmentalism. At the same time, I found
that a higher proportion of women among migrants is associated with a greater
likelihood of undertaking pro‐environmental action, supporting the gendered social
remittances hypothesis. Overall, this study highlights the role of emigration in
shaping pro‐environmental practices back home and contributes to the recent
literature showing that emigration affects social, institutional and political outcomes
in the communities and countries of origin.
A message of this study for policymakers is that emigration can result in less
pro‐environmental back home – most likely, through greater consumerism. If
policymakers are interested in minimising the adverse environmental impacts
of emigration, they could restrict emigration or, more realistically, focus on
high‐emigration areas to promote pro‐environmental action, for example through
information campaigns. At the same time, emigration of women is associated
with greater pro‐environmental action back home – most likely, through transfer
of pro‐environmental norms and behaviours. Policymakers could therefore
encourage the mobility of women, and facilitate travel and communication
between female migrants and their home communities to ensure a more effective
transfer of pro‐environmental norms and practices.
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communes in 1971
Figure S2. Local‐level emigration from the Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia in
1901‐10
Table S2. Long‐term local emigration and different types of present‐day
pro‐environmentalism, probit marginal effects; corresponds to Table 2 in the article
Table S3. Gender and education composition of the 1971 municipality‐level
emigration flows and pro‐environmentalism in 2010, OLS coefficients;
corresponds to Table 3 in the article
Table S4. Long‐term local emigration, share of women among emigrants, and
different types of present‐day pro‐environmentalism, probit marginal effects;
corresponds to Table 4 in the article
Table S5. Long‐term local emigration interacted with gender, education and
wealth, and present‐day pro‐environmentalism, OLS coefficients; corresponds
to Table 5 in the article
Table S6. Long‐term local emigration and present‐day pro‐environmentalism,
2nd stage results of instrumental variable estimations
SUMMARY
This study provides novel evidence on the effects of emigration on pro‐environmental behaviour back home.
Focusing on the seven successor states of former Yugoslavia, I explore the relationship between people’s
present‐day pro‐environmental action and the local‐level intensity of a major guestworker emigration wave
that occurred four decades earlier. I find that more intense local‐level emigration is associated with a lower
likelihood of pro‐environmental action; the instrumental variable analysis supports the causal nature of this
relationship. This finding supports the conjecture that emigration contributes to greater consumerism at
home and therefore reduces pro‐environmental behaviour. At the same time, controlling for the intensity
of local‐level emigration, a higher proportion of women in the local migrant population is associated with
a greater likelihood of pro‐environmental action. As women are generally more likely to undertake
pro‐environmental behaviour as well as transfer new norms and practices across borders, this finding
supports the hypothesis that migration contributes to a cross‐border transmission of pro‐environmental
norms and practices.
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